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THE EFFECT OF A REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION
IN MONTANA
I. INTRODUCTION
The 16th Century Italian lawyer Alciatus said about presumptions:
"The matter we are about to take up is very useful and in daily practice;
but it is confused, ahnost inextricably."1 And several centuries later Pro-
fessor Morgan observed: "Every writer of sufficient intelligence to
appreciate the difficulties of the subject-matter has approached the topic
of presumptions with a sense of hopelessness and has left with a feeling
of despair."'2
The exact function of a presumption has been the subject of debate
and the source of confusion for a long time.3 One reason for the con-
fusion is the existence of over 100 different presumptions. 4 These have
arisen from different policy considerations, and vary in their effect and
legal importance. The language applied to presumptions has too often
been loose and indiscriminate, resulting in doubt as to what a presump-
tion really is. Attempts to classify and group presumptions have added
more confusing terminology and definitions to the problem. However,
the terms conclusive presumption and rebuttable presumption (of fact
and of law) have become generally accepted as descriptive of broad
categories of presumptions.
A presumption can be defined as a conclusion which the trier of fact
is required to draw from certain other facts in the absence of evidence
to the contrary.5 It is often spoken of in terms of "basic facts" which
result in the assumption of the "presumed fact." Definition of the
broad categories of presumptions might be helpful. 7
Conclusive presumption: Once fact "A" (the basic fact) is proven, fact
"B" (the presumed fact) must be taken as true, and the adversary is not
allowed to dispute this conclusion. s The result of the rule is that the
'THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 313 (1898).
'Morgan, Presumptions, 12 WASH. L. REv. 255 (1937).
'See e.g., Bohlen, The Effect of Rebuttable Presumptions of Law Upon the Burden of
Proof, 68 U. oF PA. L. REV. 307 (1920); Gausewitz, Presumptions in a One Rule
World, 5 VAND. L. REV. 324 (1952); McCormick, Charges on Presumptions and Bur-
den of Proof, 5 N.C. L. REV. 291 (1927); Morgan, Some Obesrvations Concerning
Presumptions, 44 HARV. L. REV. 906 (1931).
'Laughlin, In Support of the Thayer Theory of Presumptions, 52 MICH. L. REV. 195
(1953).
'For further definitions see MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 701; UNIFORM RULE OF
EVIDENCE 13.
'Morgan, Forward to MODEL CODE or EVIDENCE 52 (1942).
'For definitions of smaller classifications of presumptions see Morgan, Id. at 53;
The Procedural Effect of a Rebuttable Presumption of Law, 23 U. PITT. L. REV. 685
(1962).
'9 WIGuORE, EVIDENCE § 2492 (3d ed. 1940).
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existence of fact "B" has become legally immaterial, 9 since no additional
evidence can be introduced to dispute it. Conclusive presumptions are
really rules of substantive law, rather than rules of evidence. 10
Rebuttable presumption of fact: (Inferences) Once fact "A" is proven,
the existence of the presumed fact "B" "may be inferred by the appli-
cation of the rules of logic. This seems to mean that the segment of
human experience with which the court is familiar convinces the court
that when the basic fact exists there is a reasonable probability that
the presumed fact also exists.""
Rebuttable presumption of law: Once fact "A" is proven, the existence of
fact "B" "must be assumed unless and until certain specified conditions
are fulfilled. What these conditions are is the subject of conflicting
decisions.' 1 " The presumption will be operative until satisfactorily re-
butted.
Most authorities describe the rebuttable presumption of law as the
only true presumption. 13 Since 1898, when Thayer wrote A Preliminary
Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law, there has been a great volume
of scholarly writing about presumptions. Most of it has been addressed
to the question of what effect is to be given to a rebuttable presumption
in a court of law. This article will present a general discussion of the
historical development of this effect and will then deal specifically with
the law of Montana. Conclusive presumptions and presumptions of fact
will not be considered.
II. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
Presumptions were created by the law for many different reasons.
The need for relaxing the quantum and quality of proof required by
the common law was partly responsible for their creation.4. Other rea-
sons commonly noted for the existence of presumptions are: "(1) pro-
cedural convenience, (2) to dissolve a legal impasse, (3) to satisfy a
deep-rooted social need, (4) because experience demonstrated their in-
herent probability, (5) because the facts were within the peculiar know-
ledge of the opponent of the presumption.' 5 Whatever the reason for
their creation, presumptions have had and continue to have an important
effect on the burden of proof required in a trial. But just what this
OId.
'
0 Higby v. Hooper, 124 Mont. 331, 221, P.2d 1043, 1053 (1950); 23 U. PITT. L. RFv.
685, 686 (1962).
'Morgan, supra note 6.
"Id. at 53.
1aWigmore, supra note 8; Bohlen, supra note 3.
"Bohlen, supra note 3 at 314.
I'Subrin, Presumptions and Their Treatment Under the Law of Ohio, 26 OHIo ST. L.
J. 176, 182 (1965).
[Vol. 31
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effect is remains in controversy. Is a presumption evidence? A sub-
stitute for evidence? What is its function with respect to the burden
of producing evidence and the burden of persuading the trier of fact?
Most commentators discuss these problems with reference to Pro-
fessor Thayer's writing on presumptions.16 This is certainly justified,
since Thayer was the first writer of note to give serious consideration
to the problem, and one of the most widely accepted views as to the
effect of a presumption bears his name. Thayer's view of the effect of a
presumption can best be explained in his own words.
If now, it be asked, what particular effect have rules of presumption
in applying the law of evidence?, the answer seems to be that they
have the same effect (and no other), which they have in all other
regions of legal reasoning .... In the conduct, then, of an argument,
or of evidence, they throw upon him against whom they operate the
duty of meeting the imputation. Should nothing further be adduced,
they may settle the question in a certain way, and so he who would
not have it settled thus, must show cause. This appears to be the
whole effect of a presumption .... There are, indeed, various rules
of presumption which appear to do more than this, - to fix the
amount of proof to be adduced, as well as the duty of adducing it.
But in these cases also, the presumption, merely as such, goes no
further than to call for proof of that which it negatives, i.e., for
something which renders it probable. It does not specify how much;
whether proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of
all the evidence, or by any other measure of proof. .... I
Under the Thayerian rule, the existence of a presumed fact must be
assumed until evidence has been introduced which would support a
finding that the presumed fact does not exist. The introduction of evi-
dence is the crucial point; once this has occurred, the existence or non-
existence of the presumed fact is to be determined exactly as if no pre-
sumption had ever been operative in the action. Whether the evidence
supporting the non-existence of the presumed fact is believed or dis-
believed by the judge or jury is irrelevant under this view.' 8 Thus, the
only effect of the presumption is to shift the burden of going forward
with the evidence to the party asserting the non-existence of the pre-
sumed fact.19
Professor Wigmore approved of Thayer's analysis, 20 and his influence
has had much to do with the fact that the Thayer view is the prevailing
rule in a majority of jurisdictions.2 ' Wigmore stated, "Nevertheless, it
must be kept in mind that the peculiar effect of a presumption 'of law'
• .. is merely to invoke a rule of law compelling the jury to reach the
16See e.g., articles cited supra notes 3 and 4; Gausewitz, Presumptions, 40 MINN. L. REv.
391 (1955).
"Thayer, supra note 1 at 336.
"Morgan, supra note 6 at 55.
"Id. at 55.
2WIO MORE, supra note 8.
"See CAL. EVIDENCE CODE § 601, comment; Morgan, Presumption, 10 RuTGERs L. REV.
512, 516 (1956).
1969]
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conclusion in the absence of evidence to the contrary from the opponent.
If the opponent does offer evidence to the contrary (sufficient to satisfy
the judge's requirement of some evidence), the presumption disappears
as a rule of law, and the case is in the jury's hand free from any rule."22
The so-called "Pennsylvania '23 rule gives a different interpretation
of the effect of a presumption. The rule has been described by Morgan:
"The existence of the presumed fact must be assumed unless and until
the jury finds that the nonexistence of the presumed fact is more prob-
able than its existence. In other words the presumption puts upon the
party alleging the nonexistence of the presumed fact both the burden
of producing evidence and the burden of persuasion of its nonexistence. 2 4
The Pennsylvania rule thus requires the opponent of the presumption to
do more than would be necessary under the Thayer rule. Instead of just
the introduction of some evidence, the opponent must produce evidence
sufficient to persuade the trier of fact that the presumed fact does not
exist.
Proponents of both the Thayer rule and the Pennsylvania rule
clashed over which should be included in the American Law Institute
Model Code of Evidence. The strict Thayer view was finally adopted in
the Code,25 promulgated in 1942. But this did not diminish the contro-
versy between advocates of the two rules. The Uniform Rules of Evi-
dence,26 approved in 1953, contained this modification of the Thayer rule:
Rule 14. Effect of Presumptions .... (a) if the facts from which
the presumption is derived have any probative value as evidence of
the existence of the presumed fact, the presumption continues to ex-
ist and the burden of establishing the nonexistence of the presumed
fact is upon the party against whom the presumption operates, (b)if the facts from which the presumption arises have no probative
value as evidence of the presumed fact, the presumption does not
exist when evidence is introduced which would support a finding of
the nonexistence of the presumed fact, and the fact which would
otherwise be presumed shall be determined from the evidence exactly
as if no presumption was or had ever been involved.
Almost all the writers agree that a presumption is not evidence, but
is a rule of law, a procedural device to govern the burden of persuasion
and/or the burden of going forward with the evidence.2 7 Most juris-
dictions have adopted the basic premise of the Thayer-Wigmore view,
holding that the presumption is effective to shift the burden of going
forward with the evidence but that once the opposing party introduces
2WIGMORE, supra note 8.
2For a discussion of what the law is now in Pennsylvania, see 23 U. Prix . L. Rxv. 685,
696 (1962).
2Morgan, supra note 6 at 57.
MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 704.
29A U.L.A. 602.
"Thayer, supra note 1; WIGMORE, supra note 8; Bohlen, supra note 3; Morgan, supra
note 3.
[Vol. 31
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evidence, the presumption disappears as a rule of law.28 However, al-
though the presumption itself disappears, the probative facts upon
which it was based still remain and are to be considered by the jury.2 9
III. PRESUMPTIONS IN MONTANA
In contrast to the Thayer-Wigmore majority rule, Montana statutes
expressly state that a presumption is evidence. In order to determine the
effect of a presumption in Montana, an examination of the relevant
statutes and the decisions construing them is necessary. These statutes
were enacted in 1895 ahd are identical to the Oregon and California
statutes then in effect.3 0
Revised Codes of Montana, 1947.
93-1301-1. (10600) Indirect evidence classified. Indirect evidence is of two
kinds:
1. Inferences; and,
2. Presumptions.
93-1301-3. (10602) Presumption defined. A presumption is a deduction
which the law expressly directs to be made from particular facts.
93-1301-5. (10604) Presumptions may be controverted, when. A presump-
tion (unless declared by law to be conclusive) may be controverted by
other evidence, direct or indirect; but unless so controverted, the jury
are bound to find according to the presumption.
93-1301-7. (10606) All other presumptions may be controverted. All other
presumptions are satisfactory, if uncontradicted. They are denominated
disputable presumptions, and may be controverted by other evidence.
The following are of that kind:...
The following discussion of cases will illustrate how the Montana court
has construed these statutes and developed its rule as to the effect of
presumptions.
In 1914, in Cooper v. Romney, 31 the court said that a presumption is
a form of indirect evidence, and it is valid and effective until contro-
verted by other evidence, direct or indirect. In subsequent cases, the
court expanded on this statement, saying that a presumption did not
disappear upon introduction of evidence to the contrary but rather a
conflict was created in the evidence which the jury must decide. In
2Supra, note 21.
2Supra, note 26.
O°CAL. EVIDENCE CODE § 600, effective Jan. 1, 1967, repealed sections identical to the
Montana statutes. California now says that a presumption is not evidence. Oregon
statutes are still like those of Montana. ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 41.040, 41.080, 41.310.
'Cooper v. Romney, 49 Mont. 119, 141 P. 289 (1914).
1969]
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Johnson v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co.,82 appellant's contention was that
".. . having presented testimony tending to exonerate it from negli-
gence, the presumption was overcome in the absence of a further showing
by the respondent, and a verdict should have been directed accordingly.
This is untenable. When a presumption of this character is confronted
with testimony in the opposite direction, the result is a conflict of evi-
dence which the jury must resolve. '33 In these early decisions, 34 the
Montana court construed the statutes literally and treated the presump-
tion as evidence. By holding that a case may go to the jury where on
one side there is only the presumption and on the other side there is
evidence contradicting the presumption, the court was in direct conflict
with the Thayer-Wigmore doctrine.
The rule that a presumption alone would get the proponent to the
jury was qualified in Welch v. All Persons 5 The case involved the pre-
sumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and
wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. The evidence was
heavily against the presumption. The court said that in cases where
the controverting evidence was overwhelmingly against the presumption,
the case would not go to the jury, but the presumption ". . . fades away
in the face of contrary facts." In Nichols v. New York Life Ins. Co.,37
the court relied on Welch and further defined the exception to the rule.
There, the plaintiff was trying to recover from his wife's insurance com-
pany for her death under a policy which excluded coverage for suicide.
All the evidence pointed to an intentional taking of strychnine. The lower
court allowed the case to go to the jury on the basis of the presumption
in favor of accident and against suicide where death is shown as the
result of external and violent means. A verdict was returned for the
plaintiff. The supreme court reversed, saying that defendant's motion
motion for a directed verdict should have been granted. The question
to be decided was "Does the presumption, when controverted by positive
evidence, as here, make a sufficient case for the jury?" 38  The court
answered no and went on to say, "The presumption against suicide must
give way to evidence to the contrary where it all points to suicide as the
cause of death with such certainty as to preclude any other reasonable
hypothesis. And when the evidence points overwhelmingly to suicide
as the cause of death, the question becomes one of law for the court and
not a question to be submitted to the jury."3 9
PJohnson v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 52 Mont. 73, 155 P. 971 (1916).
AId.
"See also State v. Nielsen, 57 Mont. 137, 187 P. 639 (1920).
''Welch v. All Persons, 85 Mont. 114, 278 P. 110 (1929).
"Id. at 115.
'7Nichols v. New York Life Ins. Co., 88 Mont. 132, 292 P. 253 (1930).
"Id. at 255.
1Id. at 255; see also Renland v. First National Bank of Grass Range, 90 Mont. 424,
4 P.2d 488 (1931).
[Vol. 31
6
Montana Law Review, Vol. 31 [1969], Iss. 1, Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol31/iss1/7
NOTES
The exception recognized in Nichols was enlarged in In re Wray's
Estate.4 0 Nichols had required "overwhelming" evidence against a pre-
sumption before it could be overcome as a matter of law. Wray said
that a disputable presumption is successfully controverted when proof
to the contrary satisfactorily overcomes it, and held that a preponder-
ance of the evidence was sufficient to overcome a presumption as a
matter of law and keep the case from the jury.41 Justice Angstman, con-
curring in the result, recognized that the language of the majority was a
departure from earlier decisions.
A presumption can not be overcome, as a matter of law, by what we
believe to be a preponderance of the evidence controverting it. Or-
dinarily, when there is a presumption of a certain fact and positive
evidence controverting it, an issue is made for the jury and when a
case is tried to the court without a jury, an issue is made for the
trial judge. It is only when the controverting facts are so overwhelm-
ingly against the presumption that the question becomes one of law
for the court.
The holding in the majority opinion that a presumption may be over-
come as a matter of law by a preponderance of conflicting evidence
is contrary to [citing Montana statutes] and the decisions in [citing
cases], in each of which the evidence controverting the presumption
was all one way; it was not even conflicting and it was still held
to present a fact question for the jury."
The question of just when a directed verdict against the presump-
tion was proper was considered in a case involving the presumption that
a servant driving his master's automobile was doing so in the course
of his employment. In Ashley v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,43'" If the evidence
tending to overcome the presumption that the automobile was being
driven by the servant in the course of his employment is clear, convinc-
ing, and uncontradicted, and if only one inference can be drawn by rea-
sonable men therefrom to the effect that the servant was not then en-
gaged in the master's business within the scope of his employment, then
this presumption is entirely overcome; it fades away, and a directed
verdict is proper. (citing cases)." '44
In 1938, the United States Supreme Court decided New York Life
Ins. Co. v. Gamer.4 5 The case is significant because it originated in a Mon-
tana District Court and because the United States Supreme Court refused
to apply Montana law on the effect of presumptions. The defendant had
removed the case to Federal District Court on the basis of diversity of
citizenship. It was an action to recover double indemnity for accidental
death under a life insurance policy, in which the defendant alleged
suicide on the part of the insured. There was evidence from which the
40In re Wray's Estate, 93 Mont. 525, 19 P.2d 1051 (1933).
"Id. at 1054.
"Id. at 1056.
'Ashley v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 100 Mont. 312, 47 P.2d 53 (1935).
"Id. at 57; see also In re Harper's Estate, 98 Mont. 356, 40 P.2d 51 (1934); Gagnon
v. Jones, 103 Mont. 365, 62 P.2d 683 (1936).
"New York Life Ins. Co. v. Gamer, 303 U.S. 161 (1938).
1969]
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jury might have found either accidental death or suicide. Defendant
moved for a directed verdict. The Court denied the motion and instruc-
ted the jury in part, "The presumption of law is that the death was not
voluntary and the defendant . . . must overcome this presumption and
satisfy the jury by a preponderance of the evidence, that his death was
voluntary. '46 The jury found for the plaintiff and the Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed. The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding
that the giving of the instruction was reversible error. The Court said
that the question to be resolved was whether the insured died of an
accident or by suicide. "The evidence being sufficient to sustain a find-
ing that the death was not due to accident, there was no foundation
of fact for the application of the presumption; and the case stood for
decision by the jury upon the evidence unaffected by the rule that from
the fact of violent death, there being nothing to show the contrary, acci-
dental death will be presumed. The presumption is not evidence and
may not be given weight as evidence. '4 7 The Court clearly applied the
Thayer-Wigmore doctrine of the effect of a presumption in saying that
the presumption was not evidence and that it disappeared upon the
introduction of evidence sufficient to sustain a finding that the death
was not due to accident. Mr. Justice Black dissented 48 on the basis that
the majority failed to apply Montana law and that under Montana law
the instructions were proper. He relied primarily on the Nichols case to
demonstrate the effect of a presumption under Montana law and to
support his conclusion that the instruction was correct.
The Montana court was afforded the opportunity to consider the
Gamer decision in 1942 in the case of Lewis v. New York Life Ins. Co. 49
The presumption involved was that in favor of accidental death and
against suicide. The plaintiff was trying to recover on an insurance
policy as in both Nichols and Gamer. The significance of the case is that,
although reaching a different result on the merits, the court followed
the rule of Nichols and earlier Montana decisions and expressly rejected
the rule laid down in Gamer by the United States Supreme Court. In
affirming the jury's finding for plaintiff, the court said that the evidence
produced by the defendant did not preponderate against the presump-
tion and thus the case was properly presented to the jury. In relation
to the Gamer case, the court said:
Defendant urges us to adopt the view announced in the Gamer case
to the effect "The presumption is not evidence and may not be given
weight as evidence." This court has repeatedly and without exception
held otherwise under sections 10600 and 10604, Revised Codes. It
perhaps is not correct to speak of a presumption as evidence in
spite of the provisions of section 10600 which class presumptions as
"Id. at 167.
11Id. at 171.
'
8Id. at 172.
"Lewis v. New York Life Ins. Co., 113 Mont. 151, 124 P.2d 579 (1942).
[Vol. 31
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presumption as a deduction which the law expressly directs to be
made from particular facts. Yet that does not require any change
in the rule long adhered to by this court that a presumption stands
in the face of positive evidence to the contrary except in certain
circumstances such as are found in [citing Wray and Nichols] and
must be given weight in determining the fact question. Section 10604
provides that the presumption may be controverted by other evidence.
If the presumption disappeared once evidence to the contrary ap-
peared, there would be nothing for that evidence to controvert.
Section 10604 clearly means that when positive evidence appears it
stands on one side and the presumption on the other, and the trier
of fact must weigh them both in determining the question. This
court has adhered to this view throughout its history. The rule
that the presumption stands even though controverted is not neces-
sarily based on a theory that it is evidence itself, but upon the
statutes. The legislature may define the effect of the presumption
as it has and even though, strictly speaking, it is not itself evidence,
there is no reason why the legislature cannot require that a proven
fact out of which the presumption arises be given certain probative
value which has the effect of evidence.w
Since the decision in Lewis, the court has not departed from the rule
announced there as to the effect of disputable presumptions. 51
IV. CONCLUSION
The Montana statutes classify presumptions as evidence and the
decisions construing and applying those statutes have firmly established
that a presumption does have the effect of evidence in some instances. A
disputable presumption in Montana, then, allows many cases to get to
the jury which would result in a directed verdict under the Thayer-
Wigmore doctrine. The presumption cannot be overcome by the mere
introduction of contrary evidence. It goes to the jury with other evidence
of the proponent of the presumption. If the proponent relies on the pre-
sumption alone, the jury, not the court, decides whether the presump-
tion has been successfully controverted.
This is subject to the exception noted in Nichols and Wray that the
court will grant a directed verdict against the presumption when the
evidence clearly preponderates against the presumed fact. Thus the
judge must make a decision in every case as to whether the evidence
clearly preponderates against the presumption. If he decides that it
does, he will grant a directed verdict. In such cases, the presumption
cannot be said to be evidence, since evidence does not "disappear" or
fade away upon the introduction of other evidence.
GREGORY L. HANSON
5RId. at 584.
5See e.g., In re Sword's Estate, 129 Mont. 165, 284 P.2d 674 (1955); State Highway
Commission v. Yost Farm Company, 142 Mont. 239, 384 P.2d 277 (1963).
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